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forcement as state action to situations where the courts are attempting to enforce valid private agreements, when such action will deny
to a citizen the protection of his rights to acquire, enjoy, own and
dispose of property. It should be noted that the decision in this
case in no way invalidates such restrictive covenants between individuals, merely denying to the parties the use of court facilities in
enforcing them.
M. O'D.
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Relator is a corporation organized under the Membership Corporation Law of New York State and is the legal and governing body of
a group who call themselves "Jehovah's Witnesses." Relator owns
and operates a large, well equipped and highly fruitful farm in Tompkins County, New York. Respondents, the local Board of Assessors,
held said farm to be not exempt from taxation under Section 4(6)
of the Tax Law,1 on the ground that the property was being used
for purposes other than those of a religious corporation. Relator
brought proceedings to have their action reviewed, claiming that the
property was being used primarily to feed its "ministers" gratuitously,
a purpose entitling it to tax exemption. The alleged "ministers" consist of some 250 individuals, all of whom are members of relator's
sect and all of whom live at a building maintained by relator in
Brooklyn, N. Y. The evidence does not indicate that they do any
work of a religious nature or that they are ordained in any accepted
sense of the word. In return for services ordinarily performed by
laymen, these "ministers" are paid $10.00 per month, plus "free"
food, housing and other necessities. Not only is the produce of the
farm used for feeding this group, but a large portion of it is sold to
the general public for profit. Relator has always known well in advance that such sales were to be made and has consistently derived
substantial profit therefrom. Relator claims that these are merely
incidental sales of surplus not affecting the exempt status that should
be granted because of the primary purpose of the property. Respondents made a motion for judgment. Held, motion granted and petition dismissed on the grounds that the so-called "ministers" are but
I "The following property shall be exempt from taxation: ...
"6. The real property of a corporation or association organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract . . . charitable . . . missionary . . . educational ...
purposes, . . . or for two or more such purposes, and used exclusively for
carrying out thereupon one or more of such purposes. . . .The real property

of any such corporation not so used exclusively for carrying out thereupon
one or more of such purposes but leased or otherwise used for other purposes,
shall not be exempt .....
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mere employees and that, in any event, relator's planned sales to the
public constitutes such a partial use of the property for a noncorporate purpose as precludes any exemption. People ex rel.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc., Inc. v. Mastin, 191 Misc. 899, 80
N. Y. S. 2d 323 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
Under Section 4(6) of the Tax Law of New York the real property of corporations organized for religious, charitable, educational
or other socially desirable functions are exempt from taxation. The
obvious purpose of the statute is to provide encouragement and to
make easier the task of those engaged in such noteworthy endeavors.
The often fatal limitation of the statute, however, is that the
property must be used exclusively for corporate purposes. Most
cases involving religious corporations under this statute have turned
precisely on issues involving this requirement. The burden of proof
rests heavily on the corporation claiming exemption and it must show
clearly and unequivocally that it is entitled to it.2
Since exemption from taxation is the exception to and not the
general rule, 3 the courts generally have been very strict in their interpretation of this statute. 4 If rents, profits or income are derived
from the property, no exemption will be granted. 5 Thus a theater,'
a garage 7 or an athletic field 8 owned by a charitable or educational
corporation but rented to the public will not be exempt. The fact
that, besides providing income, the premises are also used for corporate purposes is immaterial.9 Profit-making, however, is not the
sole yardstick to be used in determining exemption. It must also
appear that the use of the property is necessary or fairly incidental
to the maintenance of the institution for the carrying out of the purposes for which it was organized. 10 Consequently, if the property
is not put to any use at all " or is used for such purposes as a dumping ground for ashes 12 or for obtaining lumber to improve other

2 people ex rel. Unity Congregational Soc. of City of New York v. Mills,
189 Misc. 774, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 873 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
3 Ibid.
4 People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, 228 N. Y. 245, 126 N. E. 703
(1920).
3
Ibid.
6 People ex rel. Young Men's Ass'n v. Sayles, 32 App. Div. 197, 53 N. Y.
Supp. 67 (3d Dep't 1898), aff'd, 157 N. Y. 677, 51 N. E. 1093 (1898).
7 Board of Foreign Missions v. Board of Assessors, 244 N. Y. 42, 154 N. E.
816 (1926), modifying 207 App. Div. 151, 202 N. Y. Supp. 50, 55, 56 (2d Dep't
1923).
8 People ex rel. Adelphi College v. Wells, 97 App. Div. 312, 89 N. Y.
Supp. 957 (2d Dep't 1904).
9 People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Barke, supra note 4.
1o People ex rel. Blackburn v. Barton, 63 App. Div. 581, 71 N. Y. Supp.
933 (4th Dep't 1901).
11 Ibid.
12 New York Catholic Protectory v. City of New York, 175 Misc. 427, 23
N. Y. S. 2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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property,' 3 no exemption will be granted. However, where a charitable corporation has purchased vacant land to be used for corporate
purposes and there has been unforeseen delay in constructing buildings thereon for such purposes, the temporarily unused
land will not
4
be taxed, provided no income is received therefrom.'
It is of no consequence that the profit derived from non-exempt
activities is used by the corporation for religious or charitable purposes. 5 It is the immediate purpose for which the property is being
used and not the ultimate application of the profit that is the determining factor. The reason for such a limitation is apparent. It
would be manifestly unfair to allow a religious corporation to compete with a layman in the latter's line of business and still not tax
its property, thereby possibly enabling it to undersell the layman because of this saving in overhead. Thus we see that though this
statute is of great benefit to religious corporations, it nevertheless
does not allow this benefit to be derived at the expense of laymen.
On the question of farms, where the produce has been consumed
by members of the benevolent institution, the courts have always held
such land to be tax exempt. 16 An exception to the rule that profitmaking will bar exemption occurs when the anticipated needs of the
institution are more than met and a surplus of produce results. Such
surplus may be sold to the public without affecting the exempt status
of the property.' 7 However, such surplus must be incidental and
not by design.

It must be occasional and not continuous. 1 8 Thus

where a religious society operated a farm for the education and maintenance of its members and for 24 years showed a loss therefrom,
the mere fact that in two subsequent years a profit was realized from
the sale of surplus is not a basis for destroying the exempt status. 9
The decision in the principal case appears to be perfectly in harmony with the provisions of the statute and the decisions interpreting
them. It in no way affects property owned by religious corporations
and operated solely for corporate purposes. At the outset relator
is faced with a difficulty with which any of the more conventional re13 People ex rel. Missionary Sisters v. Reilly, 85 App. Div. 71, 83 N. Y.
Supp. 39 (2d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 178 N. Y. 609, 70 N. E. 1107 (1904).
14 Board of Foreign Missions v. Board of Assessors, supra note 7.
15 People ex rel. Mizpah Lodge v. Burke, supra note 4.
16 In re Miriam Osborn Memorial Home Ass'n, 140 N. Y. Supp. 786 (Sup.
Ct. 1912) ; People ex rel. Missionary Sisters v. Reilly, supra note 13.
"7Application of New York Conference Ass'n, - Misc. -, -, 80 N. Y. S.
2d 8, 14 (Sup. Ct. 1948). "No one can seriously urge that the Legislature
intended to penalize an institution exclusively devoted to religious and educational pursuits because it salvaged the [unused] products of one of its
departments."

18 Id. at -,

80 N. Y. S. 2d at 20.

"'Any use of the property outside of

the declared lawful purposes can be only occasional, incidental, a result of
[un]natural or unexpected conditions .....
.The use outside of lawful purposes must not be continuous,-must not become a practice ...
'
19 Application of New York Conference Ass'n, - Misc. -, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 8
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
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ligious corporations under similar circumstances would not have to
contend, i.e., of proving that the individuals residing at its Brooklyn
home are ministers. Whether or not these men are ministers is a
factual question and need not be given detailed consideration here.
In passing, however, it might be observed that if the courts are to be
vigilant in preventing organizations from using this statute as a cloak
for gaining pecuniary profit, something more than mere selfdesignation and free food and housing should be required before a
person is deemed a minister.
Granting the possibility that the individuals under discussion
might be considered ministers, relator's claim is still utterly without
merit in view of the facts appearing in the record. The produce sold
by it to the public was not, by any stretch of the imagination,
incidental surplus left over after its "ministers" were fed. Year after
year relator deliberately planned operation of the farm so as to make
these products available, knowing well in advance that they were to
be disposed of by public sale. These sales to the public, a purpose
clearly not within relator's corporate nature, constituted one of its
primary objects in operating the farm. Since such a partial use of
property for a non-corporate purpose completely destroys any possibility of exemption, the necessary conclusion is that relator's farm is
taxable. Overwhelming precedent pointed clearly and decisively to
the path this decision was to follow.
T. A. B.

